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PS1-107        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4227 
___________ 
 
STEPHEN R. KING, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL DELAWARE;  
DETECTIVE FINCH, Middletown Police Department;  
SANDRA KNAUER, L.C.S.W, Middletown Counseling Services;  
TOWN OF MIDDLETOWN; OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DELAWARE; MIDDLETOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT; 
MIDDLETOWN COUNSELING SERVICES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:10-cv-00098) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 28, 2015 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 11, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 On New Year’s Eve in 2007, Stephen R. King, then a social worker, spoke to a 
Middletown police officer on the telephone and stated that one of his charges, a 14-year-
old boy, needed a ride home.1  As the police officer was explaining that he did not run a 
taxi service, he overheard the boy say something along the lines of “he touched me.”  The 
officer went to the home to investigate.  There, the child accused King of pulling him 
close while they were on a bed together and touching him inappropriately a year earlier.  
He also stated that King had, among other things, pornography and marijuana in his 
home.  Defendant Detective Thomas Finch took over the investigation, conducting 
interviews with King and the boy and subsequently obtaining search warrants and seizing 
computers and hard drives found at the residence.   
 Detective R. Scott Garland, an experienced detective with the Delaware State 
Police High Technology Crimes Unit, then examined the seized items.  He prepared a 
summary of what he found on the computers and hard drives, concluding that the 
contents included pornographic images depicting adolescent children, primarily boys 
between the ages of 12 and 17, performing sexual acts.  Finch then referred the matter to 
Defendant Deputy Attorney General Donald Roberts. 
 After viewing the images with Garland and Finch, Roberts concurred that they 
constituted child pornography and advised Finch to arrest King.  King was arrested on 
two counts of unlawful sexual contact in the first degree, one count of possession of 
                                              
1 The boy may have initiated the contact with the police. 
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marijuana, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and 20 counts of unlawfully 
dealing in material depicting a child engaging in a prohibited act.  The Middletown 
Police Department issued a news release about the arrest that day.  About a month later, 
Roberts obtained an indictment charging King with 20 counts of unlawfully dealing in 
material depicting a child engaging in a prohibited act and two counts of unlawful sexual 
contact in the first degree.  The other charges were nolle prossed.  Subsequently, Roberts 
took a one-month leave of absence to go to a treatment center for alcoholism. 
 Richard Andrews, then a state prosecutor and now a District Judge in the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware, took over the case.  Because Andrews 
was unsure that the images depicted children, he consulted with a pediatric medical 
expert, Dr. Allan DeJong.  Dr. DeJong opined that he could not conclude with medical 
certainty that the individuals in the images were under 18 years old.  Andrews nolle 
prossed the 20 counts of unlawfully dealing in material depicting a child engaging in a 
prohibited act.  
 When Roberts returned, he took control of King’s prosecution again.  He offered 
King a deal to plead guilty to two counts of misdemeanor unlawful sexual contact, but 
King rejected it.  Roberts subsequently obtained an indictment charging King with two 
counts of felony unlawful sexual contact in the first degree and 42 counts of obscenity for 
showing nude pictures to children.2  Roberts, dealing with problems stemming from 
                                              
2 The latter group of charges stemmed from an investigation into King’s activities as a 
facilitator at a county treatment group for youth sex offenders.  After King was arrested, 
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excessive alcohol use, took a second leave of absence (thereafter, he resigned from his 
position). 
 Andrews, again responsible for the case, determined that the state could not 
proceed with the obscenity charges and had them nolle prossed as well.  Ultimately, the 
two counts of unlawful sexual conduct in the first degree were also nolle prossed.  King 
pleaded guilty to two charges brought in an information, possession of drug paraphernalia 
and endangering the welfare of a child.  He also agreed to the revocation of his license as 
a social worker and agreed never to reapply for his license in Delaware.  Later, the 
Delaware Superior Court granted King’s request to expunge his criminal record of the all 
the charges but the two to which he had pleaded guilty.  King v. State, No. 
CIVA09X07024JOH, 2010 WL 1267115 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2010).3  
 In 2010, King filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware.  In his amended complaint, he sued the Town of Middletown, the Middletown 
                                                                                                                                                  
his position was terminated and the director of the program notified parents of children 
who had participated in King’s groups to see if any were victims of other crimes.  After 
being given the newspaper article describing the arrest on child pornography charges, one 
family responded; the youth was interviewed by a county social worker.  He told the 
social worker that King showed the group pictures of teenagers engaging in sexual acts.    
 
3 The court concluded, inter alia, that the all the charges in the case had been terminated 
in King’s favor for purposes of the expungement statute.  (In so concluding, the court 
noted that the charges on which King was ultimately convicted were not related to the 
other charges; for instance, the charge of endangering the welfare of a child was related 
to having marijuana in his residence on December 30, 2007.)   
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Police Department, Finch, and Roberts for malicious prosecution and defamation.4  
Roberts filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that King’s claims were 
barred by absolute immunity, qualified immunity, sovereign immunity, and the Eleventh 
Amendment.  The District Court granted the motion in relation as to any claims raised 
against King in his official capacity and any individual capacity claims arising out of his 
conduct as an advocate (but not to those related to Roberts’s investigatory conduct, 
including his review of the seized images).     
 Roberts later filed a motion for summary judgment, as Finch, the Middletown 
Police Department, and the Town of Middletown also did jointly.  The District Court 
granted the motions.  The District Court concluded that King could not prove all the 
elements of a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to prevail against 
Roberts, did not pursue the claim against Finch, and did not argue that the other 
defendants were personally involved.  The District Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the defamation claim.  The District Court also stated that it 
would not consider any new theories of liability (namely arguments that the press release 
violated his First Amendment rights or chilled the exercise of a First Amendment right 
relating to sexual expression or the viewing of pornography in his home).   
                                              
4 He named and served two other defendants related to a previous place of employment, 
but those defendants were dismissed from the action by stipulation.  He initially also 
named the Office of the Delaware Attorney General as a defendant, but instead of serving 
that defendant, he served Roberts twice.  ECF Nos. 9 & 10.    
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 King appeals.  He argues that the facts in the record support his claim of malicious 
prosecution; Roberts, for various reasons, is not entitled to immunity from suit; his 
defamation claim should have been considered a claim under federal law; and the District 
Court should have addressed his First Amendment claims.  King further contends that the 
District Judge should have recused sua sponte and transferred the matter to a different 
venue “when it became evident that a major witness in the case was . . . Judge Andrews.”  
King also submits a motion to seal documents that have been submitted in the Appellees’ 
appendices that relate to the criminal charges that have been expunged from his record.  
(He states that the expungement order required destruction of those documents or their 
safekeeping under seal by the State Bureau of Investigation.) 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.5  Our review of the District Court’s 
rulings is plenary except for the dismissal of the state law claim, which we review for 
abuse of discretion.  Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 
2010); De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 2003); Leamer v. 
Fauver, 288 F. 3d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2002).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the 
record.  See Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 
1988).  Because King did not seek the District Judge’s recusal in the District Court, we 
review only for plain error the District Judge’s decision not to recuse, see Selkridge v. 
                                              
5 We have jurisdiction even though no claims were resolved against one of the named 
defendants (the Office of the Delaware Attorney General) because that defendant was 
never served.  See United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 674 n.2 (3d Cir. 1976).  
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United Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 166-67 (3d Cir. 2004); plain error is 
“egregious error or a manifest miscarriage of justice.”  United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 
190, 211 (3d Cir. 2005). 
     We consider the recusal issue first.  “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the 
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”  28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  If a reasonable observer aware of all the 
circumstances “would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality under the applicable 
standard, then the judge must recuse.”  In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice 
Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 343 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted).     
 It is not unprecedented for a judge to recuse when a judicial colleague is a witness.  
See Shaw Grp., Inc. v. Next Factors, Inc., No. ADV.PROC. 01-6661, 2006 WL 2356033, 
at *1 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 15, 2006) (recusing from a contentious adversary proceeding 
in which a colleague’s credibility would be judged in a bench trial).  However, recusal 
cases are very fact-specific.  See Nicols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995).  
Judges need not always recuse when a fellow judge is somehow involved in case.  See 
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, No. CIV. A. 91-2600, 1995 WL 141465, 
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1995) (noting, in declining to recuse in a case where another 
judge was said to have played a “critical role in the matters complained of,” that “[i]n 
deciding a motion for summary judgment or presiding at a jury trial, however, a judge 
does not weigh the testimony or pass upon the credibility of any witness”); cf. Rush v. 
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Borgen, No. 04-C-1154, 2006 WL 1389117, at *5-6 (E.D. Wis. May 17, 2006) 
(concluding that a state trial judge did not have to recuse himself when a fellow judge 
was a disinterested third party witness who provided duplicative factual testimony about 
a crime).  
 Under the circumstances, we conclude that King has not established plain error.  
Any error in failing to recuse, if any, was not egregious error, nor was there a manifest 
miscarriage of justice.  See Lore, 430 F.3d at 211.  Given the specific facts of this case, it 
cannot be said that the proceedings were affected.  Even if there were bias, it would favor 
King.  Then-prosecutor Andrews had doubts about the case, showed the images to a 
medical doctor, and nolle prossed the child pornography and obscenity charges.  
Furthermore, even if the plain error standard were satisfied, we would not provide the 
discretionary remedy of vacatur.  See Selkridge, 360 F.3d at 170-72.  Under the standard 
of review that we employ to evaluate the outcome in the District Court, King will get an 
independent review of his claims and the relevant legal questions.  Id. at 171-72.       
 Although King argues that Roberts should not have been granted prosecutorial 
immunity, he was entitled to absolute immunity to the extent that the District Court 
concluded.  See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490-92 (1991) (discussing the scope of 
prosecutorial immunity); Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976)).  His immunity extends to 
Roberts’s statements and actions before the grand jury and before the judge who was 
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considering King’s motion to dismiss the obscenity charges.6  See Burns, 500 U.S. at 
490-92.  Also, the suit could not be sustained against Roberts in his official capacity.  See 
                                              
6 To the extent that Roberts’s investigatory activities took him outside the scope of 
prosecutorial immunity in regards to the prosecution of child pornography charges, we 
agree with the District Court that King could not maintain his claim of malicious 
prosecution.  A claim of malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has the following 
five elements:   
 
(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; 
(2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor; 
(3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; 
(4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing 
the plaintiff to justice; and 
(5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept 
of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. 
 
Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  King and Roberts disputed whether elements two, three, and four were met.  
King was arrested after Finch applied for, and was issued, a warrant from a Justice of the 
Peace.  King argued that Roberts supplied incorrect information and an inappropriate 
determination to Finch in order to obtain the warrant.  But a claim that Roberts was 
wrong in his assessment of the ages of the persons in the pornographic images (persons 
which some said were clearly underage, but others doubted) is not a claim that Roberts 
“knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth” included false 
information in a warrant such that there was not probable cause.  See Franks v. Delaware, 
438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).  Furthermore, a grand jury indicted King.  “[I]n a section 
1983 malicious prosecution action . . . a grand jury indictment or presentment constitutes 
prima facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute.”  Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 
(3d Cir. 1989).  The prima facie evidence of probable cause “may be rebutted by 
evidence that the presentment was procured by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means,” 
id., but King did not present evidence of fraud, perjury, or other corruption.     
 
As we stated, King’s challenge to Roberts’s activities regarding the prosecution of 
obscenity charges did not reach activities that were outside the scope of absolute 
immunity.  King repeats on appeal an argument that he presented to the District Court.  
Namely, he argues that Roberts committed fraud when Roberts sought the second 
indictment by reporting to a grand jury that teenagers were shown obscene pictures 
without having viewed the pictures himself.  In defending the charges at a hearing on a 
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motion to dismiss them, Roberts conceded that he had not seen the pictures and that the 
charges were based on a description given by a participant in the youth treatment group.  
However, Roberts’s actions, whether or not erroneous, are the type protected by absolute 
immunity.  See Burns, 500 U.S. at 492 (also explaining that the safeguards in the judicial 
process obviate the need for an action for damages).   
 
We additionally note that on the record before us, it cannot be said that Roberts (even if 
he made errors in the proceedings) acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing 
King to justice.  Malice means spite or ill-will, the use of a prosecution for an extraneous 
purpose, or a lack of belief in the guilt of the accused.  Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 
1503 (3d Cir. 1993).  Beyond motives of hatred or ill will, it can include a “reckless and 
oppressive disregard of [a person’s] rights.”  Id.      
 
King argues that malice is apparent from the circumstances of his prosecution.  More 
specifically, he points to Roberts’s involvement in the investigation of the images found 
on King’s computer, Roberts’s excessive alcohol use (which, he asserted, caused 
impairment that led to mistakes, including the initial listing of 42 charges of felony 
escape instead of obscenity, and an argument with Andrews about the use of an expert), 
and Roberts’s pursuit of the (ultimately nolle prossed) obscenity charges without having 
seen the allegedly obscene images.  In the District Court, he also argued that Roberts had 
a distaste for pornography, including pornography involving homosexual activity.     
 
Roberts’s consideration of the images found on King’s computer does not suggest malice; 
to the contrary, it serves as proof that he was considering (along with others who viewed 
the images) whether it would serve justice to bring charges against King.  Furthermore, 
even if he had a distaste for legal pornography, King’s argument with his then-supervisor 
Andrews for pressing the child pornography charges apparently stemmed from his belief 
that the images were of children.  While Roberts conceded that he had problems with 
excessive alcohol use, his problems, while serious, do not suggest that he acted with 
spite, ill-will, or other malice toward King.  The mistake of using escape charges, which 
was promptly corrected, showed no more than a type of scrivenor’s error.   
 
Roberts had not viewed the allegedly obscene images, and he pursued the obscenity 
charges after the child pornography charges had been nolle prossed in his absence.  
However, he did not pursue the obscenity charges wholly without basis; he relied on a 
teenager’s statement that King showed a group sexually explicit pictures, and a grand 
jury indicted King.  See Rose, 871 F.2d at 353.  Although King equates Roberts’s actions 
to fraud or manufacturing evidence, see id., Roberts presented the evidence he had.  Even 
if he needed more evidence (or the original images) to prosecute the charges, his 
presentation of the case (to the grand jury and in his arguments at the hearing on the 
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Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Edelman v. Jordon, 415 
U.S. 651, 663 (1974).       
 Because no federal claim was actionable,7 the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in declining to entertain King’s state law claim for defamation.8  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c)(3).  Lastly, we conclude that the District Court committed no error by not 
addressing King’s late-raised First Amendment claims.  See Josey v. John R. 
Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 641-42 (3d Cir. 1993).     
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  We grant King’s 
motion to seal in the following manner:  the Clerk is directed to seal, for a period of 50 
                                                                                                                                                  
motion to dismiss) does not suggest that he did not believe that King was guilty.  For 
these reasons, even if King’s claims were such that prosecutorial immunity did not 
protect Roberts in his prosecution of the obscenity charges, we would conclude that the 
cause of action for malicious prosecution could not be maintained. 
      
7 As he has explained, King does not pursue a malicious prosecution claim against Finch, 
the Middletown Police Department, or the Town of Middletown. 
 
8 King seeks to recharacterize his defamation claim as a federal claim.  “[D]efamation is 
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if it occurs in the course of or is accompanied by 
a change or extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed by state law or the 
Constitution.”  Clark v. Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-12 (1976)).  King asserts that his defamation claim is a federal 
claim on the basis that the press release defamed him and limited his prospects for 
employment as a social worker.  However, the Supreme Court has stated that a claim of 
defamation (by a police department that circulated a flyer imputing criminal behavior to a 
person) was not a federal claim even if it would “seriously impair [that person’s] future 
employment opportunities.”  Paul, 424 U.S. at 697, 712.  Although King claims to the 
contrary, he did not include a “stigma-plus” claim in his complaint.  See Hill v. Borough 
of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that “to make out a due 
process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation, a plaintiff must show a 
stigma to his reputation plus deprivation of some additional right or interest”).  
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(fifty) years, the supplemental appendices filed by Appellee Roberts and Appellees 
Finch, Town of Middletown, and Middletown Police Department.  See generally Pansy v. 
Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786-89 (3d Cir. 1994).        
